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1 
ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred By Concluding That I.C. § 19-4301A(3) Violates The Fifth 
Amendment Right Against Compelled Self-Incrimination 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Idaho law requires any “person who finds or has custody of [a] body” to, under 
most circumstances, “promptly notify either the coroner, … or a law enforcement officer 
or agency.”  I.C. § 19-4301A(1).  The district court erred by concluding that this 
requirement violates the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination 
because notifying proper authorities about the body does not create a substantial or real 
chance that a person would provide testimonial evidence of involvement in criminal 
activities.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-8.) 
 Akins argues the district court correctly concluded that the statute “targets a 
highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities” and involves an “area 
permeated with criminal statutes,” and therefore the reporting requirement “would 
provide a link in the chain for prosecution of homicide or other crimes.”  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp. 8-23 (capitalization altered).)  None of these claims withstands analysis.  People 
who “find or have custody of” a body are not a “highly selective group inherently suspect 
of criminal activities” and determining the cause of death when unknown is not an “area 
permeated with criminal statutes”; and the mere possibility that an officer may discover 
criminal activity directly or tangentially related to the death does not convert the reporting 
requirement into self-incrimination.   
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B. Application Of The Relevant Legal Standards Shows The Requirement To Report 
Finding Or Custody Of A Body Does Not Infringe The Right Against Compelled 
Self-Incrimination 
 
 The privilege against self-incrimination applies where the hazard of self-
incrimination is “substantial and real.”  Hill v. State, Dep’t of Employment, 108 Idaho 
583, 586, 701 P.2d 203, 206 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).  A statute that requires 
a citizen to report engaging in unlawful conduct is unconstitutional.  Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).  However, “the 
Fifth Amendment privilege may not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory 
regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of 
its criminal laws.”  Baltimore City Dept. of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 
556 (1990).  The test for whether a statute requiring reporting violates the privilege is 
whether it targets a “selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities” and focuses 
“almost exclusively on conduct that was criminal.”  Id. at 559-60.  Contrary to Akins’ 
arguments, I.C. § 19-4301A does not implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination because it (1) does not require anyone to report having 
engaged in illegal behavior and (2) meets both of the elements showing it is a regulatory 
regime constructed to effect the State’s public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of 
its criminal laws. 
The duty to report a body is triggered when two things are present: (1) the death 
“would be subject to investigation by the coroner” and (2) a person “finds or has custody 
of the body.”  I.C. § 19-4301A(1).  A death is subject to investigation by the coroner 
where it (a) resulted from “violence, whether apparently by homicide, suicide or by 
accident;” (b) “occurred under suspicious or unknown circumstances;” or (c) was the 
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death of a stillborn child or any child “without a known medical disease” to account for 
the death.  I.C. § 19-4301(1).  The statute does not require any person to report having 
engaged in illegal activity, only that she has found or has custody of a body.  Moreover, it 
meets the test of being a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s public 
purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws.  Although a person who 
commits a homicide may trigger the duty to notify the coroner or law enforcement of the 
body, the vast majority of people who find or have custody of the body of a person who 
died because of homicide, suicide, accident or under unknown or even suspicious 
circumstances are not a “selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities” and the 
reporting requirement does not focus “almost exclusively on conduct that was criminal.” 
1. Akins’ Argument That The Statute Required Her To Report Involvement In 
Illegal Activity Is Without Merit 
 
Akins argues that she was required to report involvement in criminal activity 
because her disclosure of the death of Kimberly Sue Vezina “‘would furnish a link in the 
chain of evidence needed to prosecute’” her for homicide or other crimes.  (Respondent’s 
brief, pp. 21-23 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).)  This 
“link in the chain” standard, however, is inapplicable in this case.  See California v. 
Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 428 (1971) (addressing the “link in the chain” analysis but 
concluding that “under our holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to 
defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one 
challenged here,” which required notifying police of traffic accidents).  The Byers 
decision “confirms that the ability to invoke the privilege may be greatly diminished 
when invocation would interfere with the effective operation of a generally applicable, 
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civil regulatory requirement.”  Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 557.  The proper standard is 
whether I.C. § 19-4301A(1) is “a regulatory regime constructed to effect the State’s 
public purposes unrelated to the enforcement of its criminal laws,” which it is unless it 
targets a “selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities” and focuses “almost 
exclusively on conduct that was criminal.”  Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 556-60.  As set forth 
above, analysis shows that the statute meets neither prong of this test. 
2. Akins’ Argument That The Statute Targets A “Selective Group Inherently 
Suspect Of Criminal Activities” And Focuses “Almost Exclusively On 
Conduct That Was Criminal” Is Without Merit 
 
Akins also argues the district court “correctly held” that I.C. § 19-4301A(3) 
(which includes no reporting requirement) violates the privilege against self-incrimination 
because the intent element of the felony provision for failure to notify, “unlike the 
misdemeanor subsection, targets a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal 
activities.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 9.)  That a statute defining a felony applies only to 
criminals is both unsurprising and irrelevant.  The statute, in subsections (2) and (3), 
criminalizes failure to report as required by subsection (1).  I.C. § 19-4301A.  The 
distinction between the felony and the misdemeanor is the defendant’s “intent to prevent 
discovery of the manner of death.”  Id.  If the duty to report applied only to those with 
such an intent the statute would indeed target a “selective group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities.”  However, the reporting requirement, as stated above, is not nearly so 
narrow, and applies to any person who finds or has custody of the body of a person who 
died by homicide, suicide, accident, or under suspicious or unknown circumstances.  The 
reporting requirement applies to a broad range of people in a broad range of 
circumstances, not to a “selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.”  It 
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applies to many causes of death, not just those resulting from criminal acts, and thus does 
not focus “almost exclusively on conduct that was criminal.”  The district court erred by 
concluding that the element elevating criminal noncompliance with the reporting 
requirement to a felony (“intent to prevent discovery of the manner of death”) changes the 
scope of the right against compelled self-incrimination.  
Akins’ right against compelled self-incrimination was not implicated by the 
disclosure requirement of I.C. § 19-4301A(1). Indeed, the district court’s conclusion 
(endorsed by Akins on appeal) that she could have been charged with a misdemeanor for 
not reporting demonstrates this.  Akins’ motive for not complying with the reporting 
requirement did not vest her with a right against compelled self-incrimination that did not 
otherwise exist. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order 
dismissing the charge of failure to notify of a death. 
 DATED this 23rd day of March, 2018. 
 
 
 
      /s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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